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We study the convergence of European bond markets and the anchoring of inflation 
expectations in euro area countries using high-frequency bond yield data for France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain.  We find that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has 
led to substantial convergence in euro area sovereign bond markets in terms of 
interest rate levels, unconditional daily fluctuations, and conditional responses to 
major macroeconomic data announcements. Our findings also suggest a substantial 
increase in the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations since EMU, particularly 
for Italy and Spain, which since monetary union have seen their long-term interest 
rates become much lower, much less volatile, and much better anchored in response 
to news. Finally, the reaction of far-ahead forward interest rates to macroeconomic 
announcements has converged substantially across euro area countries and even been 
eliminated over time, thus underlining not only market integration but also the 
credibility that financial markets attach to monetary policy in the euro area. 
 
JEL no: E52, E58 
 
Keywords: bond markets; euro area; EMU; convergence; anchoring; credibility; 
monetary policy. 5
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Non-technical summary 
To what extent has Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe been 
successful?  In this paper, we focus on the monetary union aspects of EMU, in 
particular, the extent to which monetary union has lead to integration of financial 
markets across euro area countries, and what effects that union has had on the 
anchoring of long-term inflation expectations. We thus investigate the effects of EMU 
along two dimensions:  the unification of bond markets, and the anchoring of long-run 
inflation expectations.  These two dimensions of monetary policy in the euro area are 
intimately related because long-term bond yields in any given country are very 
sensitive to financial market expectations about long-run inflation.  Indeed, our 
analysis in this paper will focus on the insights that one can draw about the monetary 
union from the high-frequency behavior of bond yields in the euro area. 
  
First, we investigate to what extent the sovereign bond markets in France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain have become integrated along with the unification of the currency and 
of monetary policy. We propose two types of tests for bond market integration in 
these four countries.  The first looks at the unconditional correlations between yields 
of different countries.  We find strong evidence of convergence in the levels and 
comovements of yields across countries even for daily changes in yields that might be 
expected to be substantially affected by idiosyncratic shocks and differential liquidity 
characteristics.  
 
Our second type of test looks at the conditional behavior of bond yields in the euro 
area countries.  In a unified bond market, bonds of different countries (at the same 
maturity) should respond similarly to the same shock whether or not there are 
constant differences in risk or liquidity spreads and whether or not there is bond-
specific and country-specific noise. As conditioning variables, we use macroeconomic 
data surprises from the four euro area countries, the aggregate euro area, the UK and 
the US.  We find that there has been a remarkable convergence and reduction over 
time in the heterogeneity of euro area yield responses to these macroeconomic 
announcements.  This convergence process seems to have been strongest just before 
and after monetary union in 1999, underlining the likely role of monetary union in 
this process. 6
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Having established evidence in favor of bond market unification, we turn to the 
question of long-run inflation expectations in the euro-area countries.  One desired 
outcome at the time when EMU was conceived was having the countries with less 
well-anchored expectations, and therefore more volatile financial markets, benefit 
from a more credible monetary policy-making framework. We ask whether the 
volatility of very far-ahead forward interest rates has decreased over time.  Intuitively, 
if long-run inflation expectations in a country are well anchored, then its very far-
ahead forward interest rates should be more stable than if those long-run inflation 
expectations are not well anchored. 
 
Our tests for volatility of far-ahead forward interest rates are once again unconditional 
and conditional.  With our unconditional tests, we show that the volatility of far-ahead 
forward rates has decreased significantly in Italy and Spain, while remaining about 
the same in France and Germany, suggesting that the anchoring of long-run inflation 
expectations in the former two countries has converged to about the same level as the 
latter two.  This is confirmed in our conditional analysis, in which we show that the 
heterogeneity in the effects of macroeconomic surprises on far-ahead forward rates 
across euro area countries has diminished since EMU. This evidence regarding long-
term inflation expectations thus suggests that the common monetary policy has been a 
key contributor for anchoring the long-term inflation expectations of financial market 
participants across the euro area. 
 7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 817
October 2007
I. Introduction 
To what extent has Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe been successful?   
Answering this question requires defining what it means for EMU to be “successful”.  In this 
paper, we focus on the monetary union aspects of the EMU, in particular, to what extent did 
monetary union lead to integration of financial markets across euro area countries, and what 
effects did that union have on the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations within those 
countries?  We thus investigate the effects of EMU along two dimensions:  the unification of 
bond markets, and the anchoring of long-run inflation expectations.  These two dimensions of 
monetary policy in the euro area are intimately related because long-term bond yields in any 
given country are very sensitive to financial market expectations about long-run inflation.  
Indeed, our analysis in this paper will focus on the insights that one can draw about the 
monetary union from the high-frequency behavior of bond yields in the euro area. 
  
First, we investigate to what extent the sovereign bond markets in France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain, the four largest euro area countries, have become integrated along with the unification 
of the currency and of monetary policy.  While the expectations hypothesis of the term 
structure implies that long-term bond yields in all of these countries should be identical after 
EMU, the expectations hypothesis can be violated if there are time-varying risk premia in the 
bond markets (e.g., Cochrane and Piazzesi 2005), and there is much reason to think that the 
risks related to default and liquidity of each of the above sovereign bond markets may differ 
substantially.  For example, Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio in 2003 was 97%, while France’s was 
53% and Germany’s 38% (OECD, 2005), implying substantial differences in debt servicing 
burdens across the four countries in our sample. 
 
We propose two types of tests for bond market integration in these four countries.  The first 
looks at the unconditional correlations between yields of different countries.  We find strong 
evidence of convergence in the levels and comovements of yields across countries even for 
daily changes in yields that might be expected to be substantially affected by idiosyncratic 
shocks and differential liquidity characteristics.  Moreover, using the UK as a “control” 
country for comparison, we show that this convergence in levels and comovement is unique 
to the euro area members, strongly suggesting that this convergence is due to EMU rather 
than to a more general global tendency toward convergence across all developed countries. 
 8
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Our second type of test looks at the conditional, as opposed to the unconditional, behavior of 
bond yields in the euro area countries.  That is, conditional on the announcement of a given 
piece of economic news, do yields in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain react similarly?  In a 
unified bond market, bonds of different countries (at the same maturity) should respond 
similarly to the same impulse whether or not there are constant differences in risk or liquidity 
spreads and whether or not there is bond-specific and country-specific noise.  As conditioning 
variables, we use macroeconomic data surprises from the four euro area countries, the 
aggregate euro area, the UK and the US.  We find that there has been a remarkable 
convergence and reduction over time in the heterogeneity of euro area yield responses to 
these macroeconomic announcements.  This convergence process seems to have been 
strongest just before and after monetary union in 1999, underlining the likely role of 
monetary union in this process. 
 
Having established evidence in favor of bond market unification, we turn to the question of 
long-run inflation expectations in the euro-area countries.  One desired outcome at the time 
when EMU was conceived was having the countries with less well-anchored expectations, 
and therefore more volatile financial markets, benefit from a more credible monetary policy-
making framework.  Following Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), we therefore ask 
whether the volatility of very far-ahead forward interest rates has decreased over time.   
Intuitively, if long-run inflation expectations in a country are well anchored, then its very far-
ahead forward interest rates should be more stable than if those long-run inflation 
expectations are not well anchored. 
 
Our tests for volatility of far-ahead forward interest rates are once again unconditional and 
conditional.  With our unconditional tests, we show that the volatility of far-ahead forward 
rates has decreased significantly in Italy and Spain, while remaining the same in France or 
Germany, suggesting that the anchoring of long-run inflation expectations in the former two 
countries has converged to about the same level as the latter two.  This is confirmed in our 
conditional analysis, in which we show that the heterogeneity in the effects of 
macroeconomic surprises on far-ahead forward rates across euro area countries has 
diminished since EMU. 
 
Our analysis of convergence of bond yields and long-run inflation expectations in the euro 
area draws upon several strands of the literature.  Baele et al. (2004) is an early contribution 9
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that studied the convergence in the government bond markets of EMU member countries 
using a larger set of countries than we do, but with lower (monthly) frequency data; our tests 
for bond market integration at daily frequency thus represents a much stricter test for 
unification in the bond markets that we study.   Moreover, although Baele et al. find 
convergence in euro area bond yields at the monthly frequency, Manganelli and Wolswijk 
(2007) show that there is still some heterogeneity in government bond yields across countries 
that depends on the credit rating of the underlying bond.
6 Although not directly relevant to 
our financial market analysis, there is also a literature on the effects of the euro area customs 
union on the goods markets which finds mixed evidence on convergence:  for example, 
Canova, Ciccarelli and Ortega (2006) find that business cycles have not become more aligned 
in euro area countries after EMU, while Rogers (2007) finds that price dispersion across these 
countries has diminished. 
 
Our study of long-run inflation expectations builds on the work of Gürkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson (2005) for the US and Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2006) for the US, UK, and 
Sweden.  Those studies find that far-ahead forward interest rates in the US respond to 
macroeconomic announcements, while those in the UK and Sweden appear to be more 
anchored, suggesting a greater anchoring of long-term inflation expectations in the latter two 
(inflation-targeting) countries.  On the international side, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon 
(2005) show that euro area surprises do not have large effects on the US financial markets, 
while Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) find that the US spillover effects into European 
markets have increased initially after EMU, which they relate to markets’ learning.  Goldberg 
and Klein (2005), who analyze the post-EMU period, show that the response of the yield 
curve slope in the euro area to US inflation surprises has changed over this period, which 
they interpret as the ECB gaining credibility over time. 
 
                                                 
6 There has been a discussion whether the ECB’s collateral policy leads market participants to ignore differences 
in national sovereign default risk. The ECB has classified assets that can be used as collateral in its regular 
monetary policy operations, assigning specific “valuation haircuts” to each category. These haircuts specify a 
percentage discount that is applied to the market price of an asset when used as collateral. The discussion 
focused on the fact that government bonds from all national central governments have been classified in the 
same category. Buiter and Sibert (2006) argued that this will effectively turn them into perfect substitutes, such 
that markets ignore country-specific default risk. Issing (2005), on the other hand, argued that the ECB values 
any asset that is taken as collateral at market values, such that a differentiation according to default risk is 
already incorporated. The evidence of Manganelli and Wolswijk (2007) suggests that government bond yield 
spreads do in fact depend on the rating of the underlying bond. 10
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data, including 
the yields, the macroeconomic surprises as conditioning variables and the choice of sub-
periods around the advent of EMU.  Section III contains the results of the tests of 
convergence and Section IV presents the evidence on anchoring of long-term interest rates.  
Section V provides a general discussion of the findings and concludes.  A Data Appendix 
provides a detailed description of all the data used in our analysis. 
 
II. Data 
A detailed account of all the data used in our analysis is presented in the Data Appendix at 
the end of this paper, but is briefly summarized here.  The basic data we employ in our 
analysis are daily zero-coupon bond yields in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK and 
we analyze how those yields respond to macroeconomic announcements in those five 
countries, the euro area, and the US. 
 
2.1 Yields 
In order to compare “apples to apples” in our analysis below, we require bond yield data that 
are as comparable as possible across all of our countries.  This requires data from a zero-
coupon yield curve for each country, which removes differences in coupon rates, bond 
maturities, and individual bond idiosyncrasies across countries and allows for a clean 
comparison of yields from one country to another (see Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright, 2006, 
for additional discussion). 
 
We obtained daily yield curve data for Germany and Spain from the Bank for International 
Settlements in Basel and daily yield curve data for the UK from the Bank of England.  Daily 
yield curve data for France and Italy are not readily available, so we estimated the yield 
curves for these two countries using bond market price data that we obtained from 
Bloomberg Financial Services and the methods employed by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright 
(2006) for the US.
7  Because of the distribution of bond maturities available from Bloomberg, 
short-term (less than five-year) yields for France and Italy are reliable only beginning in 
1995, while five-year and longer rates for these countries and all yields for the remaining 
countries go back to 1993. 
                                                 
7 See Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright (2006) for details of this procedure. 11
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Having to estimate yield curves for France and Italy provides the unexpected benefit of being 
able to observe the evolution of efficiency and liquidity of the Italian bond market from 
before EMU to after it.  The upper panels of Figure 1 show the maturities and yields of traded 
bonds in the Italian government bond market on 1 March 1995, a typical day before EMU, 
and ten years later, on 1 March 2005.  On the earlier date, while there is a clear maturity-yield 
relationship that allows fitting a yield curve, bonds of similar maturities traded as much as a 
percentage point apart, suggesting large differences in the liquidity and heterogeneous 
characteristics of these securities.  By contrast, there are no such cases in 2005, suggesting a 
more homogeneous, liquid, and generally better functioning and more efficient bond market.  
The lower panels of the figure show that the French bond market did not experience a similar 
transition during this period, being relatively highly efficient both before and after EMU.  If 
the French bond market was more efficient than the Italian one and the two markets unified 
with EMU, one would expect to see this manifested in greater liquidity and less dispersion of 
bond prices in the Italian market, which is in fact what we observe here. 
 
2.2 Macroeconomic Announcements 
For our conditional analysis of bond market responses, we will examine the high-frequency 
behavior of bond yields in response to major macroeconomic data releases in each of France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, the euro area as a whole, the UK, and the US.  However, it is not 
enough to use the raw macroeconomic data releases themselves as explanatory variables 
because financial markets are forward-looking and thus should not respond to the component 
of these announcements that are expected (Kuttner, 2001, confirms this hypothesis for the 
case of monetary policy announcements in the US).  Thus, we wish to construct the 
unexpected or surprise component of each of our macroeconomic data releases and use these 
data release surprises as the conditioning variables for our bond market analysis. 
 
We compute the macroeconomic data release surprises as the realized value of the 
macroeconomic data release on the day of the announcement less the financial markets’ 
expectation for that realized value.  We obtained data on financial market expectations of 
major macroeconomic data releases from two sources:  Money Market Services (MMS) and 
Bloomberg Financial Services.  Details of these data are provided in the Data Appendix.  12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 817
October 2007
 
Andersen et al. (2003) and others have verified that these data pass standard tests of forecast 
rationality and provide a reasonable measure of ex ante expectations of the data release. 
 
Note that, to make our regression coefficient estimates comparable across different data 
releases, we normalize each series by its sample standard deviation, so that the regression 
coefficient on each series can be interpreted as a response per one standard deviation surprise.  
For example, on 21 October 1998, the German IFO index was expected to come in at 97 but 
the released value was 94; since the historical standard deviation of the surprise in this data 
release is 1.16, we record this as a surprise of -2.58 standard deviations for that statistic on 
that date. 
 
Two additional issues regarding the macroeconomic data surprises bear further discussion.  
One is availability, as most of the surprises for Italy and Spain in our sample are available 
only from the beginning of 1997 onwards, and euro area aggregate data releases are generally 
available only beginning in 1999.  Also, after the introduction of the euro, no national 
monetary aggregate releases were made any longer, so that only the euro area aggregate and 
its surprise component is available to us from that date onward.  Table A-1 in the Appendix 
lists all of the macroeconomic data surprise series we have used and the dates for which they 
are available. 
 
The second issue is that European bond yields often react very little to European 
macroeconomic announcements, as we will show below.  For this reason, we include US and 
UK surprises in our analysis as well.  This has the added benefit that these series are often 
available over a long history, typically for as long as our bond yield data are available.  Note 
that using “foreign” surprises here does not create a problem for studying bond market 
integration.  Being agnostic on why US surprises moves European yields, we only assert that 
if one country’s yields are responding to a given data surprise, others’ should as well if bond 
markets are integrated.   
 
2.3 Sample periods 
A final point relates to our choice of subsample periods.  The decision to have a monetary 
union within the EU was agreed on in the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, which was 
followed by the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) crisis in September 1992, in which 13
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several countries devalued their currencies and dropped out of the exchange rate system.  We 
thus begin our sample in 1993 to make sure the results are not driven by the very high 
volatility in the immediate aftermath of the ERM crisis, although there was still some 
currency volatility and uncertainty in subsequent years.  In May 1998, the eligible countries 
for inclusion in the monetary union were announced, and on 1 January 1999 the exchange 
rates for the countries entering monetary union were irrevocably fixed and the euro was 
introduced. 
 
Given this timeline, we use 1993-98 as our pre-EMU sample and 2002-2006 for the post-
EMU sample.  We begin the latter sample in 2002 to make sure that we are not capturing 
effects of the initial period of evolving credibility of the ECB, as argued by Goldberg and 
Klein (2005). 
 
We check these subsample choices more formally using an Andrews-Ploberger (1994) break 
point test to detect the precise date of structural changes in the yields of euro area countries.  
For this purpose, we regress the yield of each country on the corresponding German yield and 
a constant—a test to which we will return to in more detail in section 3.  Table 1 shows that 
the date for the structural breaks occurs before 1 January 1999, usually in 1996 or 1997, 
suggesting that markets anticipated the beginning of monetary union well ahead of time.  The 
similarity in the break point across countries and yields underlines the similarities in yield 
changes in euro area countries.  Instead of taking 1 January 1999 as the end of the pre- EMU 
period, we therefore could also have taken an earlier break point.  However, our preferred 
data is 1 January 1999 as this formally meant the introduction of the euro.  Note that by not 
choosing an earlier break point, we bias our results against our hypotheses.  Since we 
possibly include data points where bond markets had already converged, we should find 
weaker evidence for bond market integration in our comparisons of the pre- and post-EMU 
periods.  Moreover, we stress that our results are insensitive to variations in the beginning 
and end dates of the two subsamples.  In particular, starting the pre-EMU sample in 1994 or 
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III. Convergence of Yields 
We begin by investigating the degree to which yields of different maturities have converged 
across our four euro area countries, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.  Given that “a high 
degree of sustainable convergence” was a prerequisite for entry into the monetary union, 
finding some degree of convergence in yields before the ECB came into existence is to be 
expected.  Our interest is in the timing and the extent of this convergence.  We first study the 
yields across countries unconditionally and then look at the conditional correlations, using 
major macroeconomic data release surprises as the conditioning variables. 
 
3.1 Unconditional Results 
To study whether and when the government bond markets in Germany, France, Italy, and 
Spain integrated with EMU, we focus on the daily behavior of bond yields in these four 
countries.  The advantage of using such high-frequency data for our analysis is that it sets a 
higher standard for bond market convergence:  at lower frequencies, it is more likely that 
some degree of cross-country arbitrage will reduce interest rate differentials across those 
countries and make those bond markets appear more similar.  That is, finding convergence in 
financial markets using monthly data is more likely than finding it in daily data.  Our results 




The evolution of daily yield curves for each of our four euro area countries is summarized in 
Figure 2, the central figure of this sub-section.  The top panel of the figure depicts the two-
year bond yields at daily frequency.  At the beginning of the sample period, the German two-
year yields are the lowest, with the French yields slightly above them.  The Spanish and 
Italian two-year yields are five to six percentage points higher than the other two.  The most 
striking feature of the graph is the speed and extent of the convergence of yields.  The French 
and German yields had become identical by 1997 and the Spanish and Italian ones joined 
them by 1999.  The lines for the four countries are indistinguishable from then on. 
 
This is striking precisely because we are using daily data.  There is not a single day after 
1999 on which the two-year yield on government notes was noticeably different in one of the 
                                                 
8 While they focus, as all other studies, on monthly data, Codogno et al. (2003) also include a section that 
studies one year of daily data. 15
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countries compared to the others.  That is, the short term bond markets in these countries 
were unified to the extent that any deviations across countries appear to have been arbitraged 
away on a daily basis.  Note, importantly, that convergence had taken place even before 
monetary union had actually taken place.  That is, the expectation of unification unified the 
sovereign bond markets, which is confirmed by the results of the structural break point test 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
To ensure that this convergence is due to EMU and is not an artifact of broader convergence 
in the yields of industrialized European countries, Figure 2 also includes the two-year yield 
from the UK, an EU member that is not a member of the euro area.  The UK two-year yield 
clearly stands out in the figure, suggesting that convergence in rates did indeed happen 
because of the monetary union and not because of other global or regional factors that were 
leading to convergence across developed countries’ financial markets more generally. 
 
The middle panel of Figure 2 repeats the analysis using five-year yields.  We have data on 
five-year yields for all of our countries going back farther, to 1993, but the results are very 
much the same as for two-year yields.  Finally, the bottom panel of the figure depicts ten-year 
yields, which shows that there is slightly more variation across countries in long-term interest 
rates—in particular, the Italian ten-year yield has been somewhat higher than the others in the 
recent past—but this difference is tiny compared to the differences before 1999. 
 
We present three kinds of statistical measures to quantify the extent of the convergence that is 
so striking visually in Figure 2.  First, we look at the raw correlations of yields of the same 
maturity between different countries for the pre-EMU (1993-1998) and post-EMU (2002-
2006) samples.  Second, we show regression results for each country’s yields regressed on 
German yields of the same maturity in each of the two sample periods.  Finally, we provide 
evidence from principal component analysis. 
 
The results of the first two tests are reported in Tables 2 and 3.  The correlation analysis 
confirms the visual impression and earlier results for lower frequency data in that the 
correlations between the yields of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain have increased 
significantly after EMU—in fact almost all of these are .99—while the correlations of the 16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 817
October 2007
 
yields of these countries with those of the UK have decreased.
9,10  The R
2 statistics of the 
regression of each country’s yields on the German yields repeat the information in the 
correlations.  Interestingly, the proportion of the variance that these simple regressions can 
explain appears to be even larger than those reported in Baele et al. (2004), especially for the 
shorter maturities, suggesting that convergence has strengthened over the most recent years 
covered in our sample.  This is particularly striking given the fact that we analyze daily 
frequency data, which, as mentioned above, one would expect to show less comovement than 
data at lower frequencies.  However, rather than the R
2 statistics, the regression coefficients 
themselves are the objects of interest this time.  The slope coefficients, which were quite far 
from unity pre-EMU, have become economically indistinguishable from unity across the four 
countries after EMU, while the coefficients in the regressions involving the UK have 
continued to have slopes of varying magnitudes.
11  Consistent with the convergence 
hypothesis, the constants in the regressions have also shrunk towards zero from the pre-EMU 
to the post-EMU sample. 
 
Another way to think about bond market unification is that it implies there will be a single 
latent factor that affects yields of the same maturities across all the different country’s 
markets.  We explore this implication using principal components analysis.  Let X denote the 
T×4 matrix with rows corresponding to days and columns corresponding yields of the same 
maturity (2, 5 and 10 year yields) in different countries’ sovereign bond markets. X can be 
written as: 
         XF I -       
where F is a T×k matrix of unobserved factors (with k < 4),   is a k×4 matrix of factor 
loadings, and   is a T×4 matrix of white noise disturbances. The hypothesis that sovereign 
                                                 
9 Throughout the paper we study unconditional relationships in levels and conditional ones in changes.  This is 
to make the results comparable to the similar literature where, for example, level/slope/curvature 
decompositions of the yield curve (which we study in section 4) always refers to levels while event studies using 
surprises employ changes in yields—the object of interest is the returns.  It is reassuring that our results would 
be broadly similar if we presented the unconditional analyses in changes as well. 
10 Almost all of the changes in correlation coefficients across samples are significant because with daily data we 
have very large numbers of observations in each sample, leading to very precise estimates.  Note that the 
correlation coefficients are estimated over the sample for which data exits in all countries, effectively making 
the early sample for the two-year yield the 1995-1998 period.   
11 Statistically the slope coefficients are not quite unity as with daily data we estimate these with a very high 
degree of precision using daily data.  Thus .99, while economically not different from unity, remains statistically 
different from it.  17
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bond markets are integrated is a statement that there exists a T×1 vector F and constants  i, 
i=1,...,k, such that the matrix X is described by F × [ 1,..., k] up to white noise. 
 
In Table 4, we report the percentage of total variation of the data that is explained by the first 
two principal components.  The factor loadings show that the first factor loads evenly on all 
countries (the common factor) while the second factor differentiates Italy and Spain from 
France and Germany.  In the pre-EMU period, the second factor explains a non-negligible 
part of the total variation in all maturities, whereas in the post-EMU period the first, common 
factor explains essentially all of the variation.  That is, the factor analysis implies that after 
EMU there is a single latent factor—in effect, a euro area-wide factor—that describes the 
behavior of yields in all of these countries, suggesting that since monetary union bond 
markets across our countries have become completely integrated. 
 
All together, the results in this section show, visually and statistically, a remarkable 
convergence in bond yields of the four largest euro area countries due to monetary union.  
We next move from the unconditional results to the conditional ones and ask how the 
responses of the yields of different euro area countries to data surprises have changed from 
before monetary union to after. 
 
3.2 Conditional Results 
Of course, a finding of convergence in bond yields in an unconditional sense could come 
about in two different ways.  First, bond markets may have reacted similarly to common 
shocks during both the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods, but country-specific idiosyncratic 
shocks were much more important in the pre-EMU period.  The diminishing importance of 
country-specific idiosyncratic shocks would then show up in the bond markets as 
convergence.  Alternatively, common shocks may have been equally important in both the 
pre-EMU and post-EMU periods, but bond markets in each country may have reacted 
differently to these common fundamental shocks before EMU and more similarly after EMU.  
To investigate more fully the type of convergence that has taken place, we now analyze the 
conditional movements in bond yields in our four countries in response to major 
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, %  denotes the daily change in the yield of maturity j (j  {2, 5, 10} years) of 
country i (i  {France, Germany, Italy, Spain}) on date t.  We have surprise data from six 
countries and the euro area (k  {France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, US, euro area}) and 
there are Lk data series used from each of these, indexed by l (l {CPI, Unemployment, 
etc.}).  Due to data availability, we have more data surprises for the US than for any other 
country, but this does not present any particular difficulties because US macroeconomic data 
release are known to significantly affect financial markets in Europe as well as in the US 
(Andersen et al. 2007, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005).  Note that, due to data availability, not 
all of the data releases we consider were present in both the pre- and post-EMU samples. 
 
Regression results from specifications using the complete set of all 37 of our data release 
surprises are not presented to save space and because most of those coefficients are not 
statistically significant anyway, especially for European macro data announcements in the 
pre-EMU period.
12  Therefore, we report in Table 5 regression results from a more 
parsimonious specification that uses a much smaller subset of the available macroeconomic 
announcements, in particular, the most important US data releases (as suggested by Fleming 
and Remolona, 1999), the CPI inflation releases for each of the four euro area countries, and 
the M3 growth rates for Germany and the euro area as a whole (which may be expected to 
matter because of the emphasis on monetary aggregate growth rates first by the Bundesbank 
and then by the ECB). 
 
The most important point of Table 5 is that before EMU there were no cases where all 
countries’ yields responded significantly to the same data release.  One could use this as a 
                                                 
12 This finding is in line with Goldberg and Leonard (2003), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005), and Andersson et 
al. (2006), who document that US data releases are the most important fundamental surprises for the European 
financial markets.  A number of explanations have been offered for this result, such as the more timely release 
of US figures, the dominant position of the US in the global economy, the fragmented release of European data 
(such as, e.g., German CPI figures, which are released consecutively for the individual Federal States), and 
possible leaks from the European statistical agencies (which have been documented for German unemployment 
data by Andersson et al.).  Results from regressions with all macro data releases are available from the authors 
upon request. 19
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definition of market segmentation—prices are not moved by the same common 
fundamentals.
13  By contrast, after EMU yields of euro area countries have begun to react in a 
much less heterogeneous manner to macro shocks.  In Table 5, this is especially the case for 
the major releases of US ISM, US nonfarm payrolls and the German IFO index.  
 
The results in Table 5 are summarized graphically in Figures 3 and 4, which depict the time-
varying responses of yields to nine of these potentially relevant macro surprises, using a 
rolling estimation of 4-year windows.  Figure 3 plots the raw response coefficients over time, 
but since we are primarily interested in the heterogeneity in the responses of yields across 
countries, Figure 4 summarizes the results in Figure 3 by plotting the cross-sectional standard 
deviation of the response coefficients C
i across countries at each point in time (that is, when 
the coefficients C
i differ greatly across our four countries, then the cross-sectional standard 
deviation plotted in Figure 4 is higher).  This figure allows us to visualize the evolution over 
time of the cross-country heterogeneity in yield responses with a single aggregate measure. 
 
Similar to the results in Table 5, there is clear evidence in Figure 4 for a convergence in the 
response patterns of yields in our four euro area countries to these macroeconomic surprises.  
Moreover, this convergence process seems to have been strongest just before and after 
monetary union in 1999, underlining the likely role of monetary union in this process. 
 
There is also some evidence in Figure 3 of trends in the effects of macro surprises over time.  
Some macro surprises, such as US non-farm payroll employment, and to some extent the 
German IFO confidence index and the US ISM survey, may have started to exert a generally 
larger impact on bond markets over time.  By contrast, other macro variables, such as 
domestic inflation announcements, have been exerting a smaller effect on bond markets over 
time.  This finding is sensible as it suggests that with a common monetary policy and an 
integrated euro area bond market what matters for each country’s bond market is not the 
individual country’s rate of inflation, but that of the euro area as a whole. 
 
                                                 
13 It is worthwhile repeating that the inference we want to draw here is not about the direction of the effect.  
Positive US surprises, for example, may increase or decrease yields in other countries, and we do not take a 
stand on this.  Our test is that if a fundamental surprise has an effect on the yields of one country, it should have 
the same effect on the yields of other countries if bond markets are unified, regardless of the direction of the 
effect. 20
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To summarize, the evidence in Table 5 and Figures 3 and 4 suggests that the unconditional 
convergence in euro area bond yields documented in the previous section cannot be attributed 
simply to a reduction in the importance of idiosyncratic, country-specific shocks in those 
countries over time.  Instead, there appears to have been a remarkable convergence in the 
response of euro area yields even conditioning on individual macroeconomic data releases.  
The timing of this convergence also suggests that monetary union did lead to convergence 
and unification in euro area bond markets, and that such a unified market was not present 
before EMU.  This convergence appears to have taken place both in an unconditional and a 




IV.  Anchoring of Inflation Expectations and Long Rates 
Finally, we investigate the anchoring of long-run inflation expectations in the euro area and 
the benefits that some of those countries might have achieved from entering the monetary 
union.  In previous work, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (GSS, 2005) and Gürkaynak, 
Levin, and Swanson (GLS, 2006) used long-term bond yields to investigate the anchoring of 
inflation expectations in the US, UK, and Sweden, and we build on their analysis here.  In 
particular, in standard macroeconomic models in which the steady-state inflation objective of 
the central bank is constant over time and known by all economic agents, short-term interest 
rates return relatively quickly to a deterministic steady state after a macroeconomic shock, so 
that these shocks have only transitory effects on the future path of interest rates.  As a result, 
one would expect only a very limited response of long-term interest rates to these 
disturbances.  Putting this prediction in terms of forward rates, one would expect virtually no 
reaction of far-ahead forward interest rates to such shocks. 
 
Conceptually it is perhaps easiest to think about the term structure implications of shocks in 
terms of forward rates rather than yields.  For a bond with a maturity of m years, the yield 
() m
t r  represents the rate of return that an investor requires to lend money today in return for a 
single payment m years in the future (for the case of a zero-coupon bond).  By comparison, 
the k-year-ahead one-year forward rate 
() k
t f  represents the rate of return from period t+k to 
period t+k+1 that the same investor would require to commit at time t to a one-year loan 
beginning at time t+k and maturing at time t+k+1.  The link between these concepts is 21
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simple:  an m-year zero-coupon security can be viewed as a sequence of one-year forward 
agreements over the next m years.  The k-year-ahead one-year forward rate 
() k
t f  can thus be 


















Intuitively, the difference between the nine and ten year yields depend on the expected yield 
for the tenth year and this can be recovered through the formula above. 
 
The advantage of using forward rates rather than yields is that they serve as a proxy for 
expectations of future values of the short-term interest rate, up to a (possibly time-varying) 
term premium.  If the term premium is relatively stable over time, then the discussion in the 
previous section (and the analysis in GSS and GLS) suggests that far-ahead forward interest 
rates should be unresponsive to news if inflation expectations are well anchored.
14 
 
Thus, if EMU improved the anchoring of inflation expectations in our four euro area 
countries, this should be reflected in a reduced volatility of far-ahead forward interest rates 
and their responsiveness to shocks.  We again investigate this implication in two parts, first 
unconditionally and then conditional on major macroeconomic data releases.  Given our 
interest in studying long-term inflation expectations, we focus our analysis on the longest 
maturity for which we have high-quality bond yield data across all of our countries.  The 
exceptional depth and liquidity of the markets for government securities around the ten-year 
horizon thus suggests focusing on the one-year forward rate from nine to ten years ahead (i.e., 
the one-year forward rate ending in ten years).  As shown in GSS and GLS, this horizon is 
easily long enough for standard macroeconomic models to essentially return to steady state, 
so that any movements in forward interest rates at these horizons are very difficult to attribute 
to transitory responses of the economy to a shock. 
 
                                                 
14 GSS and GLS present evidence that suggests that the risk premium is not varying substantially at the daily 
frequencies considered in that paper and that we will consider here.  For example, much of the finance literature, 
such as Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), has suggested that risk premia move primarily at business cycle 
frequencies and should be countercyclical, while the responses of far-ahead forward interest rates in GSS and 
GLS at daily frequency are procyclical, which contrasts sharply with the finance literature’s predictions.   
Moreover, changes in long-term real interest rates do not seem to be a good explanation, since GSS and GLS 
show that far-ahead forward indexed bond rates in the US, UK, and Sweden do not seem to move systematically 
in response to macroeconomic data releases.  Instead, all of the evidence presented in those papers is consistent 
with a model in which changes in financial market perceptions regarding the long-term inflation objective of the 
central bank are driving the responses of long-term bond yields. 22
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4.1  Unconditional forward rates 
Studying the simple summary statistics for far-ahead forward interest rates in France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain turns out to be very instructive.  Table 6 reports the means and 
standard deviations of the forward rates for each of these countries in the pre- and post-EMU 
periods.  While the fall in the means of these rates is impressive for Italy and Spain, our 
primary interest here is in their variability.  Remarkably, the variability of the forward rates in 
Italy and Spain is twice as large as those in France and Germany in the pre-EMU period, 
while the forward rates in all four countries are essentially invariable in the post-EMU period.  
Moreover, while the forward rates of France and Germany become somewhat better anchored 
(less variable) after EMU,
15 the forward rates in Italy and Spain become much better 
anchored after the monetary union.  Thus, it seems that the latter two countries benefited 
substantially from joining the euro area not only in that the levels of their forward rates have 
declined, but also in that their variability has fallen substantially and converged to that of 
France and Germany. 
 
Another way of making this point is through factor analysis.  When yields of different 
maturities are decomposed into factors, it is standard to find a “level” factor that moves yields 
of all maturities in the same direction and by about as much, and a “slope” factor that rotates 
the yield curve.  We ask how much of the variability in 2-10 year yields is explained by each 
of these factors in the four countries in the pre- and post-EMU periods.  Table 7 presents the 
results. 
 
In the pre-EMU period, both the “level” and “slope” factors affected the yields of France and 
Germany, with a dominant weight on the level factor (the first factor in Table 7), similar to 
the US and UK (not reported).  In contrast, Italy and Spain in this period had only one 
factor—the level factor—influencing their yields, as this factor explains essentially all of the 
variation in yields of all maturities.  That is, almost all movements in the yield curve that 
changed short-term interest rates were typically seen as level shifts, or permanent changes, 
affecting the long end of the yield curve by about as much as the short end.  Thus, this 
evidence suggests a very low level of anchoring of long-term interest rates in Italy and Spain 
in the pre-EMU period. 
 
                                                 
15 For German rates, this is also reported in European Central Bank (2004). 




After EMU, however, the weights on the level/slope factors for Italy and Spain begin to look 
much more like those of France and Germany.  Moreover, the slope factors (the second 
factors in Table 7) in all four countries appear to have become more important after the 
advent of EMU.  Thus, not only did the variability of far-ahead forward rates decrease 
significantly in Italy and Spain after the monetary union, they also became less closely tied to 
short-term rates, implying a lesser degree of pass-through from the short-term interest rate 
outlook to expectations about interest rates in the far future.  By this metric, it appears that 
Italy and Spain obtained a much better anchoring of long-term interest rates and inflation 
expectations as a result of entering the monetary union.  
 
4.2 Conditional Results 
Finally, we study the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations in France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain in terms of their conditional as well as unconditional behavior.  If the monetary 
authority is credible enough that long-term inflation expectations in a given country are well-
anchored, then macroeconomic announcements today should have no systematic effect on 
forward interest rates in that country far enough in the future.  On the other hand, if long-run 
inflation expectations are not perfectly anchored, then macroeconomic announcements today 
may induce financial market participants to systematically revise their beliefs about long-run 
inflation outcomes, so that macroeconomic announcements today may systematically 
influence the very long end of the yield curve as well as the short end. 
 
Table 8A reports regression results for specifications analogous to those in Table 5 for 
shorter- and long-term bond yields; in Table 8A, these regressions are performed with the far-
ahead forward interest rate in each country as the dependent variable.  Figure 5 graphically 
shows the evolution of the responsiveness of the long-end of the yield curve to data surprises.  
What is striking in the rolling regressions using a four-year window of Figure 5 is that the 
point estimates of the far-ahead forward rate for all countries to basically all releases 
convergence towards zero in the post-EMU period.  
 
However, comparing the pre-EMU with the post-EMU periods may not be very illuminating.  
was also the case in Table 5 for the shorter-term and long-term bond yield regressions.  As 
we mentioned previously in the discussion of Table 5, this could be due to a number of 
Working Paper Series No 817
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reasons, such as the staggered release of European data or possible leaks by European 
statistical agencies, such that we cannot infer whether the non-responsiveness of far-ahead 
forward interest rates in Table 8A simply reflects a lack of power as opposed to well-
anchored long-term inflation expectations.  Accordingly, a comparison with the post-EMU 
sample, where we similarly find barely any significant responses, is not very telling. 
 
What can be taken away from Table 8A, however, is a comparison of the response of short-
term yields with the response of far-ahead forward interest rates.  If inflation expectations in a 
given country are not perfectly anchored, then one might expect that macroeconomic 
announcements lead to level shifts in the yield curve—that is, data releases that affect the 
two-year yield should also affect the far-ahead forward rate in the same direction (this was 
certainly the case in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) for the US and Gürkaynak, 
Levin, and Swanson (2006) for the UK before Bank of England independence).  Recall from 
Table 5A that after monetary union, there are several surprises that significantly affected two-
year yields in the countries we study (Spanish CPI, German IFO, US nonfarm payrolls and 
US NAPM).  By contrast, in Table 8A, none of these surprises systematically moves far-
ahead forward rates—that is, in the post-EMU period we have identified some 
announcements that seem to change financial market expectations about the economic 
outlook enough to change ECB policy expectations and hence two-year bond yields, yet these 
changes in the economic outlook do not extend far enough into the future to affect far-ahead 
forward interest rates.  It appears therefore that the ECB is seen to be credible enough to 
bring inflation back to its target over the medium-term horizon so that the far-ahead forward 
interest rates do not respond systematically to the surprises in macroeconomic 
fundamentals.
16   
 
We further emphasize this point in Table 8B, which uses the same regression specification as 
in Table 8A, but where the dependent variable is now the change in the slope of the yield 
curve, with the slope measured as the difference between the 9-year-ahead one-year forward 
                                                 
16 Two related studies need mentioning here. Goldberg and Klein (2005) make a similar point but their emphasis 
is on the learning of credibility so they only study the post-EMU period using the US core CPI release for a 
smaller number of euro area countries.  The recent work of Beechey et al. (2007), again only for the post-EMU 
period, support our findings in that there are macro announcements to which short nominal rates respond, yet 
inflation compensation derived from inflation swaps remains unchanged.  25
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rate and the two-year yield.
17  If bond market participants expect the ECB to respond to 
developments in the economy, then macroeconomic announcements will induce them to 
change their outlook for the near future, changing the two-year yield, but if long-term 
inflation expectations are well-anchored, then the far-ahead forward rate should not move 
systematically in response to these releases.  This will be reflected as a change in the slope of 
the yield curve. Table 8B verifies that the slope of the yield curve does in fact seem to 
respond significantly to many of these data releases in the post-EMU period, just as would be 
expected if the story above were true. 
 
A second piece of evidence in support of this point comes from the evolution of the cross-
country heterogeneity in yield reactions.  Figure 6 shows that the heterogeneity in the effects 
of macroeconomic surprises before EMU was much stronger at the long end of the maturity 
spectrum, for far-ahead forward rates.  Comparing also with the other maturities in Figure 4, 
the strongest reduction over time in the heterogeneity in response patterns is also recorded for 
the longer maturities.  At the end of the sample period, the dispersion in how yields respond 
to common macroeconomic shocks has become much more similar across maturities. A final 
important point to note is that the convergence in response patterns across countries did not 
take place immediately with EMU in 1999, but occurred rather gradually over the years and 
in some cases till 2003 or 2004. This again suggests that there has been a substantial increase 
in anchoring of inflation expectations over time, consistent with a built-up of policy 
credibility. 
 
In sum, both our unconditional and our conditional results in this section provide evidence of 
a substantial improvement in the anchoring of far-ahead forward interest rates (and, by 
implication, long-term inflation expectations) in the euro area.  This has been especially true 
for Italy and Spain in the post-EMU period. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
According to our analysis for France, Germany, Italy, and Spain—the four largest members 
of the euro area—the monetary union in Europe does seem to have led to essentially a single, 
unified euro area bond market, despite the fact that there may be credit risks that differ across 
                                                 
17 The very large (in absolute value) and significant coefficient for the Italian slope response to the German M3 
release in the pre-EMU sample shown in the table is due to a single outlier in March 1996.  Omitting this 
observation reduces that coefficient to an insignificant -0.9.  26
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countries and liquidity characteristics that may vary from one sovereign bond to another.  
Moreover, our analysis has shown that this convergence took place not only for the level of 
bond yields across countries but also for their day-to-day movements, both unconditionally in 
terms of volatilities and conditionally in terms of their responses to major macroeconomic 
announcements. 
 
Equally importantly, we find evidence of convergence in the extent to which long-run 
inflation expectations in our four euro area countries are well-anchored, as reflected in the 
unconditional and conditional behavior of far-ahead forward interest rates.  This 
improvement was by far the most dramatic for Italy and Spain, which over time have 
managed to obtain far-ahead forward interest rates that are now as low and as stable as those 
of Germany and France. 
 
While the elimination of exchange rate risk undoubtedly accounts for a large part of the 
convergence that we have shown for euro area bond markets, our evidence regarding long-
term inflation expectations also suggests that the common monetary policy has been an 
important contributor.  In particular, the ECB’s quantitative definition of price stability seems 
to have contributed to anchoring the long-term inflation expectations of financial market 
participants across the euro area. 
 
However, in contrast to the strong evidence for convergence in financial markets, there is 
evidence that the real economies in the euro area have seen a much lower degree of 
convergence (Canova et al. 2006).  This has interesting implications for the conduct of 
monetary policy, which is transmitted to the national economies via financial markets in a 
rather homogeneous way, yet faces less uniform situations with regard to the real economy.  
Other interesting aspects to study are whether convergence in financial markets fosters 
further real convergence.  We leave these important questions for future research. 
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Table 1: Andrews-Ploberger structural break test 
break point sign. break point sign. break point sign.
2-year yields:
   Constant 1997:06:16 *** 1997:07:02 *** 1996:12:18 ***
   German rate 1997:07:04 *** 1997:08:19 *** 1997:04:25 ***
5-year yields:
   Constant 1996:06:10 *** 1997:06:16 *** 1996:11:04 ***
   German rate 1996:06:14 *** 1997:07:04 *** 1996:11:20 ***
10-year yields:
   Constant 1996:04:08 *** 1996:10:02 *** 1996:09:19 ***
   German rate 1996:04:17 *** 1996:11:01 *** 1996:11:04 ***
9-year forward:
   Constant 1996:02:14 *** 1996:05:16 *** 1996:04:10 ***
   German rate 1996:02:14 *** 1996:09:20 *** 1996:04:10 ***
France Italy Spain
 
Notes. Statistics show break date and p-value of test statistics of Andrews-Ploberger (1994) test for structural 
breaks in the mean equations, regressing countries’ yields on the German yield of corresponding maturity and a 
constant. 30
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Table 2.  Correlations of rates 
             
A. Correlations of two-year yields 
Pre-EMU Post-EMU 
    FR GE IT  SP UK FR GE  IT  SP UK   
FR 1.000         1.000     FR
GE 0.930 1.000       0.997 1.000    GE
IT 0.863 0.694 1.000       0.998 0.997 1.000    IT
SP 0.908 0.762 0.990 1.000     0.996 0.997 0.996 1.000   SP
UK  0.691 0.793 0.559 0.587 1.000 0.501 0.469 0.482 0.502 1.000 UK
  Sample size: 953      Sample size: 1228     
             
             
B. Correlations of five-year yields 
Pre-EMU Post-EMU 
    FR GE IT  SP UK FR GE  IT  SP UK   
FR 1.000         1.000     FR
GE 0.969 1.000       0.998 1.000    GE
IT 0.945 0.905 1.000       0.997 0.996 1.000    IT
SP 0.965 0.922 0.991 1.000     0.997 0.997 0.994 1.000   SP
UK  0.845 0.841 0.785 0.797 1.000 0.678 0.673 0.659 0.676 1.000 UK
  Sample size: 1428      Sample size: 1228     
             
             
C. Correlations of ten-year yields 
Pre-EMU Post-EMU 
    FR GE IT  SP UK FR GE  IT  SP UK   
FR 1.000         1.000     FR
GE 0.981 1.000       0.983 1.000    GE
IT 0.959 0.929 1.000       0.995 0.991 1.000    IT
SP 0.966 0.940 0.995 1.000     0.990 0.977 0.984 1.000   SP
UK  0.950 0.952 0.907 0.910 1.000 0.772 0.787 0.772 0.727 1.000 UK




Note. Boldface entries are statistically significantly larger (at 1 percent) than 
their counterparts in the corresponding sample.  
 31
ECB




Table 3.  Regressions of yields on German yields 
           
A. Two-year yields 
 Pre-EMU  Post-EMU 
  FR  IT SP  UK  FR  IT SP  UK 
GE  1.425*** 2.498*** 2.495*** 0.628*** 0.971*** 0.969*** 0.958*** 0.345*** 
    (0.022) (0.073) (0.057) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) 
Constant  -1.524***  -3.297***  -4.129***  3.992*** 0.015*** 0.070*** 0.063*** 3.338*** 
    (0.089) (0.315) (0.245) (0.073) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.047) 
Observations  953  953  953  953  1228 1228 1228 1228 
R-squared  0.86 0.48 0.58 0.63 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.22 
          
          
B. Five-year yields 
 Pre-EMU  Post-EMU 
  FR  IT SP  UK  FR  IT SP  UK 
GE  1.170*** 2.524*** 2.386*** 0.829*** 1.004*** 1.075*** 1.053*** 0.459*** 
    (0.005) (0.028) (0.022) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) 
Constant -0.856*** -5.434*** -5.398*** 2.443***  -0.059*** -0.209*** -0.191*** 2.922*** 
    (0.027) (0.155) (0.124) (0.079) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.035) 
Observations  1428 1428 1428 1428 1228 1228 1228 1228 
R-squared  0.94 0.82 0.85 0.71 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.45 
          
          
C. Ten-year yields 
 Pre-EMU  Post-EMU 
  FR  IT SP  UK  FR  IT SP  UK 
GE  1.112*** 2.456*** 2.221*** 1.091*** 0.972*** 0.997*** 1.038*** 0.444*** 
    (0.004) (0.025) (0.021) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Constant  -0.523***  -6.109***  -5.295***  0.641*** 0.248*** 0.325*** 0.003  2.850*** 
    (0.023) (0.149) (0.130) (0.058) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.029) 
Observations  1428 1428 1428 1428 1228 1228 1228 1228 
R-squared  0.96 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.62 
  Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 4.  Principal Components Analysis  
of Yields Across Countries 
            
              
Contribution of First Principal Component 











Year   
 Yield  Yield  Yield  Yield  Yield  Yield   
  Pre-EMU Post-EMU   
Contributions of                
First PC  0.895 0.962  0.971  0.998  0.997  0.990   
Second PC  0.097 0.031  0.024  0.001  0.002  0.006   
                
Factor Loadings             
First Factor              
FR 0.517  0.504  0.503  0.500  0.500  0.501  
GE 0.472  0.493  0.496  0.500  0.500  0.499  
IT 0.497  0.499  0.500  0.500  0.500  0.501  
SP 0.513  0.504  0.502  0.500  0.500  0.499  
Second Factor             
FR 0.249  0.268  0.308  -0.426  -0.001  0.208  
GE 0.709  0.687  0.661  0.178  -0.149  -0.675   
IT -0.538  -0.546  -0.531  -0.491  0.770  -0.210  
SP -0.382  -0.399  -0.432  0.739  -0.620  0.676  
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  Table 5A. Response of Two-Year Yields to Surprises 
  Pre-EMU Post-EMU 
   FR  GE  IT  SP  FR  GE  IT  SP 
FR  CPI  -0.135  0.730  -0.443 -0.310 0.531 0.489 0.391 0.648 
  (0.595)  (0.495) (0.785)  (0.755) (0.548) (0.604) (0.565) (0.706) 
GE  CPI  1.851**  0.632 1.397  1.852* 0.478 0.309 0.526 0.585 
  (0.770)  (0.641) (1.017)  (0.977) (0.395) (0.435) (0.407) (0.509) 
IT CPI  -0.196  -0.004  0.752  0.233  -0.249  -0.030  0.070  -0.082 
  (0.820)  (0.682) (1.082)  (1.039) (0.554) (0.610) (0.571) (0.714) 
SP CPI  0.509  -0.808  -0.401  0.278  1.126***  0.666  1.057**  1.009* 
  (1.074)  (0.894) (1.417)  (1.362) (0.434) (0.478) (0.447) (0.559) 
GE IFO  0.960  0.900  0.309  1.402  1.540***  1.958***  1.369***  1.537** 
  (0.773)  (0.643) (1.019)  (0.979) (0.468) (0.515) (0.482) (0.603) 
GE  M3  0.331  1.155  0.996  0.722  - - - - 
  (0.874)  (0.728)  (1.154)  (1.109)  - - - - 
EA  M3  -  -  -  -  0.209 0.625 0.183 0.502 
  -  -  -  -  (0.464) (0.511) (0.478) (0.598) 
US CPIX  1.082  0.304  -0.441  3.116***  0.495  0.942  0.547  1.224* 
  (0.948)  (0.789) (1.250)  (1.201) (0.569) (0.626) (0.586) (0.733) 
US NonFarm 
Pay.  1.633*** -0.473  -0.627  -0.024  4.416*** 1.874*** 4.275*** 2.645*** 
  (0.566)  (0.471) (0.746)  (0.717) (0.599) (0.660) (0.617) (0.772) 
US  NAPM  0.552  -0.228  0.329  -0.381  1.708*** 2.021*** 1.588*** 1.811*** 
  (0.673)  (0.560) (0.888)  (0.853) (0.497) (0.547) (0.512) (0.640) 
Constant -0.431*  -0.331  -1.282***  -1.367***  0.260  0.133  0.338*  0.248 
    (0.261)  (0.218) (0.345)  (0.331)  (0.180) (0.198) (0.185) (0.232) 
Observations  296  296 296  296  429 429 429 429 
Notes. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) results. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 





  Table 5B. Response of Five-Year Yields to Surprises 
  Pre-EMU Post-EMU 
   FR  GE  IT  SP  FR  GE  IT  SP 
FR  CPI  -0.697  0.047  -1.372  -0.520  0.602 0.573 0.110 0.768 
  (0.617) (0.566)  (1.140) (0.873) (0.612) (0.624) (0.669) (0.729) 
GE  CPI  0.964 0.263  1.395 0.760  0.423 0.355 0.383 0.413 
  (0.834) (0.766)  (1.543) (1.181) (0.441) (0.450) (0.482) (0.525) 
IT CPI  -0.320  0.147  0.056  -0.247  -0.238  -0.090  0.139  -0.326 
  (0.932) (0.856)  (1.724) (1.320) (0.619) (0.631) (0.676) (0.737) 
SP CPI  0.153  -0.567  -0.108  -0.029  1.057**  0.832*  0.675  0.970* 
  (1.222) (1.122)  (2.259) (1.729) (0.484) (0.494) (0.529) (0.576) 
GE IFO  1.358  0.569  0.720  0.352  1.359***  1.967***  1.438**  1.420** 
  (0.868) (0.797)  (1.605) (1.228) (0.522) (0.533) (0.571) (0.622) 
GE  M3  0.462  3.759***  0.131  3.061***  - - - - 
  (0.603)  (0.554)  (1.115) (0.853)  - - - - 
EA  M3  -  -  -  -  0.138 0.782 0.144 0.933 
  -  -  -  -  (0.518) (0.529) (0.566) (0.617) 
US CPIX  0.888  -0.518  -0.192  0.478  0.619  0.898  0.563  1.219 
  (0.741) (0.681)  (1.371) (1.049) (0.635) (0.648) (0.694) (0.756) 
US NonFarm 
Pay.  0.865  -0.930*  -0.767  -0.104  4.679*** 1.910*** 5.103*** 2.580*** 
  (0.570) (0.523)  (1.054) (0.806) (0.669) (0.682) (0.731) (0.796) 
US  NAPM  0.852  -0.039  0.397  0.063  1.920*** 2.010*** 2.196*** 1.869*** 
  (0.675) (0.620)  (1.249) (0.956) (0.554) (0.566) (0.606) (0.660) 
Constant -0.517**  -0.309 
-
0.768*  -1.171***  0.204 0.105 0.286 0.016 
    (0.250) (0.230)  (0.462) (0.354) (0.201) (0.205) (0.220) (0.239) 
Observations  416 416  416 416  429 429 429 429 
Notes. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) results. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 





  Table 5C. Re ponse of Ten-Year Yields to Surprises 
  Pre-EMU Post-EMU 
   FR  GE  IT  SP  FR  GE  IT  SP 
FR CPI  -0.455  0.016  -1.893  -0.038  0.571  0.491  0.320  0.539 
 (0.588)  (0.594)  (1.164) (0.835)  (0.550)  (0.621)  (0.567)  (0.759) 
GE CPI  0.566  0.159  1.698  0.406  0.361  0.357  0.484  0.328 
 (0.796)  (0.804)  (1.575) (1.130)  (0.396)  (0.447)  (0.409)  (0.546) 
IT CPI  -0.508  0.219  0.156  -0.733  -0.323  -0.011  -0.339  -0.419 
 (0.890)  (0.898)  (1.761) (1.263)  (0.556)  (0.628)  (0.574)  (0.767) 
SP CPI  0.301  -0.417  0.789  -0.030  0.775*  0.734  0.685  0.467 
 (1.166)  (1.177)  (2.307) (1.655)  (0.435)  (0.491)  (0.449)  (0.600) 
GE IFO  1.461*  0.530  0.846  0.737  0.928**  1.742***  0.968**  0.849 
 (0.828)  (0.836)  (1.639) (1.176)  (0.470)  (0.530)  (0.484)  (0.648) 
GE  M3  0.380  4.193***  -1.028  2.993***  - - - - 
  (0.575)  (0.581)  (1.139) (0.817)  - - - - 
EA M3  -  -  -  -  0.159  0.836  0.101  0.938 
 -  -  -  -  (0.466)  (0.526)  (0.480)  (0.642) 
US CPIX  0.677  -0.717  0.140  1.027  0.677  0.707  0.734  -0.269 
 (0.708)  (0.714)  (1.400) (1.005)  (0.571)  (0.644)  (0.588)  (0.787) 
US NonFarm 
Pay.  0.581  -0.949* 1.985*  -0.312  3.559*** 1.582** 3.441*** 0.477 
 (0.544)  (0.549)  (1.076) (0.772)  (0.601)  (0.678)  (0.620)  (0.829) 
US NAPM  0.602  -0.129  0.383  -0.187  1.329***  1.876***  1.490***  1.598** 
 (0.645)  (0.651)  (1.276) (0.915)  (0.498)  (0.563)  (0.514)  (0.687) 
Constant -0.561**  -0.235  -0.636  -1.161***  0.076  0.063  0.073  -0.190 
   (0.239)  (0.241)  (0.472) (0.339)  (0.181)  (0.204)  (0.186)  (0.249) 
Observations 416  416  416  416  429  429  429  429 
Notes. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) results. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of Far-Ahead Forward Rates 
          
 FR  GE  IT  SP 
  Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. Mean St.  Dev. 
Pre-EMU  7.22 1.02 6.93 1.00 9.24 2.22 8.78 1.84 




Table 7.  Principal Components Analysis    
of Yields within Countries   
             
            
           
  Pre-EMU Post-EMU 
Contributions  of  FR GE IT  SP FR GE IT  SP 
First  PC  0.969 0.957 0.999 0.998 0.912 0.950 0.928  0.924 
Second  PC  0.031 0.043 0.001 0.002 0.087 0.050 0.071  0.074 
           
            
Factor Loadings            
First Factor            
2 Year Yield 0.322 0.307 0.333 0.333 0.299 0.309 0.306  0.303 
3 Year Yield 0.330 0.331 0.333 0.333 0.324 0.330 0.326  0.326 
4 Year Yield 0.336 0.339 0.333 0.333 0.340 0.339 0.339  0.339 
5 Year Yield 0.338 0.341 0.334 0.334 0.348 0.342 0.345  0.346 
6 Year Yield 0.338 0.340 0.334 0.334 0.349 0.342 0.346  0.346 
7 Year Yield 0.337 0.339 0.334 0.334 0.345 0.340 0.343  0.343 
8 Year Yield 0.335 0.337 0.333 0.333 0.339 0.337 0.338  0.338 
9 Year Yield 0.333 0.334 0.333 0.333 0.331 0.333 0.331  0.332 
10 Year Yield 0.331 0.332 0.333 0.333 0.324 0.329 0.325  0.325 
Second Factor           
2 Year Yield 0.584 0.695 0.549 0.426 0.582 0.638 0.577  0.585 
3 Year Yield 0.428 0.381 0.456 0.431 0.421 0.399 0.419  0.419 
4 Year Yield 0.245 0.172 0.254 0.323 0.250 0.210 0.248  0.247 
5 Year Yield 0.072 0.023 0.068 0.164 0.088 0.057 0.089  0.086 
6 Year Yield -0.074 -0.090 -0.080 -0.006 -0.054 -0.069 -0.052  -0.055 
7 Year Yield -0.192 -0.180 -0.194 -0.164 -0.174 -0.174 -0.172  -0.175 
8 Year Yield -0.283 -0.254 -0.284 -0.298 -0.274 -0.264 -0.274  -0.274 
9 Year Yield -0.353 -0.316 -0.355 -0.402 -0.356 -0.341 -0.359  -0.356 
10 Year Yield -0.406 -0.371 -0.413 -0.473 -0.423 -0.408 -0.431  -0.423 
 





  Table 8A. Re ponse of Far-Ahead Forward Rates to Surprises 
  Pre-EMU Post-EMU 
   FR  GE  IT  SP  FR  GE  IT  SP 
FR CPI  -0.228  -0.185  -2.364  0.742  0.505  1.081  0.811  0.334 
 (0.734)  (0.853)  (2.538) (1.168)  (0.582)  (0.979)  (0.679)  (1.331) 
GE CPI  -0.056  0.264  3.476  -0.202  0.349  0.194  0.726  0.195 
 (0.994)  (1.154)  (3.433) (1.580)  (0.419)  (0.705)  (0.489)  (0.958) 
IT CPI  -0.820  2.532**  0.834  -1.011  -0.519  0.865  -0.944  -0.388 
 (1.111)  (1.290)  (3.837) (1.766)  (0.588)  (0.990)  (0.687)  (1.345) 
SP CPI  0.724  -0.606  2.529  -0.220  0.531  -0.096  0.921*  -0.008 
 (1.455)  (1.690)  (5.028) (2.314)  (0.460)  (0.774)  (0.537)  (1.053) 
GE IFO  1.611  1.239  0.973  1.659  0.423  0.159  0.139  0.003 
 (1.034)  (1.201)  (3.572) (1.643)  (0.497)  (0.836)  (0.580)  (1.136) 
GE M3  -0.018  5.063***  -2.484  2.557**  -  -  -  - 
 (0.718)  (0.834)  (2.482) (1.142)  -  -  -  - 
EA M3  -  -  -  -  0.268  0.785  0.026  0.796 
 -  -  -  -  (0.493)  (0.829)  (0.575)  (1.127) 
US CPIX  0.345  -0.719  1.193  2.440*  0.855  -0.310  0.753  -2.432* 
 (0.883)  (1.026)  (3.052) (1.404)  (0.603)  (1.015)  (0.704)  (1.380) 
US NonFarm 
Pay. 0.201  -2.335***  1.485  -1.218  2.116*** 0.751  1.122  -2.411* 
 (0.679)  (0.788)  (2.345) (1.079)  (0.636)  (1.070)  (0.742)  (1.454) 
US NAPM  0.126  -0.873  -1.244  -1.324  0.400  0.730  -0.079  1.184 
 (0.805)  (0.935)  (2.780) (1.279)  (0.527)  (0.887)  (0.615)  (1.205) 
Constant -0.623**  0.093  0.713 
-
1.567*** -0.093 0.265 -0.200  -0.362 
   (0.298)  (0.346)  (1.029) (0.474)  (0.191)  (0.321)  (0.223)  (0.437) 
Observations 416  416  416 416  429 429  429  429 
Notes. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) results. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
s
Working Paper Series No 817
October 200738
ECB




  Table 8B. Response of the Slope of the Yield Curve to Surprises 
  Pre-EMU Post-EMU 
   FR  GE  IT  SP  FR  GE  IT  SP 
FR CPI  0.052  -0.807  -0.674  0.742  -0.026  0.592  0.420  -0.314 
 (0.827)  (0.845)  (2.140)  (0.702) (0.597)  (0.885)  (0.717)  (1.556) 
GE CPI  -1.903*  -0.311  0.893  -1.076  -0.129  -0.116  0.200  -0.390 
 (1.071)  (1.094)  (2.770)  (0.908) (0.430)  (0.637)  (0.516)  (1.120) 
IT CPI  -0.796  2.460**  -0.421  -1.202  -0.270  0.896  -1.014  -0.306 
 (1.139)  (1.164)  (2.947)  (0.966) (0.603)  (0.894)  (0.725)  (1.573) 
SP CPI  0.038  0.141  2.333  -0.333  -0.595  -0.762  -0.136  -1.017 
 (1.493)  (1.526)  (3.862)  (1.266) (0.472)  (0.700)  (0.567)  (1.231) 
GE IFO  0.859  0.876  2.716  0.493  -1.117**  -1.799**  -1.230**  -1.534 
 (1.074)  (1.097)  (2.777)  (0.911) (0.509)  (0.755)  (0.612)  (1.328) 
GE M3  -1.334  1.060  -14.171***  0.434  -  -  -  - 
 (1.215)  (1.242)  (3.144)  (1.031) -  -  -  - 
EA M3  -  -  -  -  0.059  0.160  -0.157  0.294 
 -  -  -  -  (0.505)  (0.749)  (0.607)  (1.317) 
US CPIX  -0.141  -0.239  4.804  0.659  0.359  -1.251  0.207  -3.656** 
 (1.317)  (1.346)  (3.406)  (1.117) (0.619)  (0.917)  (0.744)  (1.613) 
US NonFarm 
Pay. -1.351*  -1.979**  8.847***  0.180  -2.300***  -1.123  -3.153***  -5.056*** 
 (0.786)  (0.804)  (2.034)  (0.667) (0.652)  (0.967)  (0.784)  (1.700) 
US  NAPM -0.676  0.068 0.258  -1.172  -1.309**  -1.290  -1.667**  -0.627 
 (0.935)  (0.956)  (2.419)  (0.793) (0.541)  (0.801)  (0.650)  (1.410) 
Constant -0.592  0.298  0.968  0.047  -0.353*  0.132  -0.539**  -0.610 
   (0.363)  (0.371)  (0.940)  (0.308) (0.196)  (0.290)  (0.235)  (0.511) 
Observations 296  296  296  296  429  429  429  429 
Notes. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) results. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1% 39
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Figure 3.  Response of yields to macroeconomic surprises 
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Note.  Slope coefficients from rolling regressions with four-year 
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Notes: The figure shows the standard deviation in the response coefficients C across the four euro area 
countries in the sample (France, Germany, Italy, Spain) from 
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Figure 5.  Response of 9-year-ahead 1 year forward rate 
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Note.  Slope coefficients from rolling regressions with four-year 
windows, as described in text.  45
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Figure 6.  Heterogeneity in the effects of macroeconomic surprises, 1-year forward rates 


































































































Notes: The figure shows, for the 1-year forward rates in 9 years, the standard deviation in the response 
coefficients C across the four euro area countries in the sample (France, Germany, Italy, Spain) from 
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Appendix A. Data Construction 
 
a. Yields 
The daily smoothed yield curve data comes from the Bank for International Settlements for 
Germany and Spain. German data have the key BISM.D.HSJA.DE, and Spanish data 
BISM.D.HSJA.ES.  The UK yields are available on the Bank of England’s web page at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk.  We use the zero coupon continuously compounded yields.  
Italian and French yields yield curves at daily frequency going back to early 1990’s were not 
readily available therefore we estimated those ourselves, using underlying bond data from 
Bloomberg. The yield curves estimated were of the Extended Nelson-Siegel (Svensson) 
functional form.  Bloomberg only had bonds with at least five years to maturity available for 
early in the period therefore we do not use short-term yields (less than five years) before 1995 
for France and Italy.  
  
b. Macroeconomic Data Surprises 
Data on U.S. macroeconomic statistical releases and forecasts were collected by Money 
Market Services up through July 2003, when that company merged with a larger financial 
institution. Subsequent to July 2003, the same survey was produced again by Action 
Economics. These data can be purchased from Haver Analytics as part of the “MMS” series 
of data at http://www.haver.com. For the U.K., we also obtained MMS data Haver Analytics.  
 
Bloomberg also carries out surveys of expectations for macroeconomic data releases and 
almost perfectly when they both exist.  We used Bloomberg data to fill in gaps in the MMS 
data late in the period for the US and UK.  Data on individual country releases for France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain and the euro area aggregates also come from Bloomberg.   
Bloomberg’s macroeconomic data release coverage begins in 1996 which limits our 
macroeconomic data surprises from the continental European countries to this period.  Euro 
area aggregates come into existence in 1999. 
 
Many of the series are reported as both month-on-month (and quarter-on-quarter) and year-on 
year changes.  In these cases we chose the version that had the most number of available 
observations, which, for this sample, more often were the month-on-month numbers (German 
publishes these together with the realized values.  The MMS and Bloomberg numbers agree 47
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M3 is the exception, in this case we use the year-on-year rates).  We have verified that using 
year-on-year versions do not change the results of our analyses.   
 
 
Table A-1. Availability of Surprise Data 
Surprise Begins  Ends 
US Capa. Util.  Jan-93  Dec-06 
US Cons. Conf  Jan-93  Dec-06 
US CPIX  Jan-93  Dec-06 
US GDP  Jan-93  Dec-06 
US NAPM  Jan-93  Dec-06 
US NonFarm Pay.  Jan-93  Dec-06 
US New Hom.  Feb-93  Dec-06 
US Ret. Sales  Jan-93  Dec-06 
US Unemp.  Jan-93  Dec-06 
UK Avg. Earnings  May-98  Dec-06 
UK GDP  Apr-93  Nov-06 
UK Man. Prod.  Mar-93  Dec-06 
UK PPI  Mar-93  Dec-06 
UK RPIX  Mar-93  Dec-06 
UK Ret. Sales  Mar-93  Dec-06 
EA Bus. Climate  May-99  Oct-06 
EA CPI  Jan-99  Nov-06 
EA Ind. Prod.  Jan-99  Nov-06 
EA M3  Mar-99  Nov-06 
EA Unemp.  Feb-99  Nov-06 
GE CPI  Mar-93  Nov-06 
GE IFO  Aug-96  Nov-06 
GE Ind. Prod.  Mar-93  Nov-06 
GE M3  Mar-93  Jan-99 
GE Man. Ord.  Mar-93  Nov-06 
GE Unemp.  Mar-93  Nov-06 
FR Cons. Confid.  Dec-96  Oct-06 
FR CPI  Mar-93  Nov-06 
FR Ind. Prod.  Mar-93  Nov-06 
FR M3  Mar-93  Feb-96 
FR Unemp  Feb-93  Oct-06 
IT CPI  Jan-97  Nov-06 
IT Ind. Prod.  Mar-97  Nov-06 
IT Unemp.  Jun-97  Sep-06 
SP CPI  Feb-97  Nov-06 
SP Unemp.  Nov-97  Nov-06 
SP. Ind. Prod.  Mar-97  Nov-06 
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